The archive quotes former KGB General Oleg Kalugin, who was posted to Delhi in the 1970s, as saying: "It seemed like the entire country was for sale; the KGB and the CIA had penetrated the Indian government. Neither side entrusted sensitive information to the Indians, realizing their enemy would know all about it the next day".
The Mitrokhin Archive provides a startling, if sometimes debated, narrative of Soviet intelligence dominance in India. It paints a picture of a nation heavily influenced by external forces during a critical period in global history. For students of intelligence, history, and geopolitics, these documents remain an essential, though controversial, resource.
"Cross-referencing the new Russian dossiers, sir," Vikram lied, or rather, told a version of the truth. mitrokhin archive india pdf
When Volume II was published, the BJP (then opposition) used excerpts to attack Congress, claiming Indira Gandhi’s government was infiltrated. Congress countered that the BJP was using “foreign intelligence” to settle domestic scores.
With him came thousands of pages of meticulously copied top-secret documents. When these files were compiled and published by historian Christopher Andrew in the early 2000s, they sent shockwaves across the globe. Perhaps no country felt the impact of these revelations more acutely than India. The archive quotes former KGB General Oleg Kalugin,
The archive details covert KGB operations from the 1930s to the early 1980s, including assassinations, disinformation campaigns ( dezinformatsiya ), recruitment of agents (including "illegals"), and the financing of communist parties worldwide. The material was eventually co-authored into two primary volumes by historian :
"Have you seen the chapter on India?" asked the Director of Intelligence, standing by the window, watching the rain blur the skyline. It paints a picture of a nation heavily
– Files suggest the KGB helped shape India’s tilt toward the Soviet Union, including during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War (leading to Bangladesh’s creation).
Furthermore, critics of "defector literature" point out that former intelligence officers like Mitrokhin had a strong incentive to embellish or even fabricate details to prove their value to their new hosts in the West. Christopher Andrew himself has acknowledged this limitation, admitting that the KGB may have convinced itself it had far greater influence on Indian politics than it actually exercised. He also conceded that the spy agency "fatally overestimated its own influence," pointing out that despite its massive investment, it failed to anticipate the sudden backlash against Mrs. Gandhi after the Emergency was lifted.